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**Producing Software Obsolescence: the case of Android OS**

Journal:	<i>ACM Journal on Responsible Computing</i>
Manuscript ID	Draft
Manuscript Type:	Research Article
Computing Classification Systems:	Software and its engineering~Software creation and management~Collaboration in software development~Open source model, Software and its engineering~Software organization and properties~Contextual software domains~Operating systems, Software and its engineering~Software creation and management~Software post-development issues~Maintaining software, Social and professional topics~Professional topics~Computing profession~Computing organizations, Social and professional topics~Computing / technology policy, Social and professional topics~Professional topics~Management of computing and information systems~Software management~Software, Social and professional topics~Professional topics~Management of computing and information systems~System management, Human-centered computing~Collaborative and social computing~Empirical studies in collaborative and social computing

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## Producing Software Obsolescence: the case of Android OS

In the Android ecosystem, the most widely used operating system (OS) in the world, devices are rarely updated more than two years after their release. We investigate what hinders Android maintenance, and the deployment of OS updates. We conducted twelve interviews with key players in the ecosystem, supplemented with conference ethnography and analysis of technical literature. Based on this corpus, we clarify the structure of the Android ecosystem and show that there is not just one Android OS, but rather a specific Android build for each smartphone model. We show that the way code flows are organized across the various ecosystem actors inhibits updates, and we outline how these actors locate their maintenance efforts in different places to serve their strategic interests.

The lack of updates appear at the kernel level, i.e., at the core of Android builds, as the code from phone vendors and system on chip manufacturers increasingly diverges from the original Linux kernel code. We show that Google, the main actor governing the Android ecosystem, addresses maintenance issues by shifting the responsibility towards phone vendors. However, as vendors are the least inclined actors to maintain their code, the problem remains, leading to premature end-of-life for devices and, consequently, their obsolescence. In parallel, we analyze how, driven by a concern on longevity, some phone vendors and alternative free and open-source mobile actors are implementing remediation strategies to maintain devices.

Reflecting on the Android ecosystem, we discuss the various maintenance strategies we have observed and the play between openness and closure in software development and maintenance.

CCS Concepts: • Software and its engineering → Open source model; Operating systems; Maintaining software; • Social and professional topics → Computing / technology policy; Computing organizations; Software maintenance; System management; Governmental regulations; • Human-centered computing → Empirical studies in collaborative and social computing.

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Obsolescence, Smartphone, Android, Update, Fragmentation, Frankenkernel, Linux, Google, FOSS

### ACM Reference Format:

. 2026. Producing Software Obsolescence: the case of Android OS. 1, 1 (February 2026), 29 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/nnnnnnn>.  
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### 1 Introduction

Smartphones appear to be the poster child of “disposable technology”, i.e., devices that are neither maintained, nor meant to be repairable or recyclable, but rather replaced [34, 55]. By way of illustration, more than 1.2 billion smartphones were sold worldwide in 2024, with an average lifespan around 3.5 years. By comparison, embedded software typically have lifespans of 7 to 15 years. And the software on the Voyager 1 space probe software is still running nearly 50 years after its launch, with software updates performed in 2023.

The lack of updates is one of many reasons why consumers renew their smartphones. Although social and psychological factors are at play in renewal decisions, software factors do have a significant role [39]. Without software maintenance, devices tend to become slower and less reliable, but also less secure.

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5 In the Android ecosystem, devices are rarely updated, despite the release of a new version of the Android operating  
6 system (OS) every year. The proliferation of Android phone vendors, device models, and active OS versions, known as  
7 the Android fragmentation problem, generates maintenance issues at both the OS and application levels [59].  
8

9 Recent studies define the lifespan of devices in terms of obsolescence [7, 8], viewing it not only as a technical or  
10 engineering quality, but also as being influenced by socio-cultural and socio-economic factors. As Cohn argues in her  
11 work on software maintenance [6], we hypothesize that the Android update process should also be investigated through  
12 a social and organizational lens. Rather than a simple OS, Android can be understood as an ecosystem of organizations  
13 involving actors with different values, who interact through code exchanges, shared libraries, documentation, test  
14 benches, commercial partnerships, competing or complementary business models, to name but a few.  
15

16 In order to study the socio-technical challenges associated with the development and maintenance of Android, we  
17 carried out a multifaceted fieldwork. We conducted 12 interviews with key players in the Android mobile ecosystem (de-  
18 velopers of the Linux kernel, Google, Fairphone, Commown, and alternative mobile OSes or libraries). We supplemented  
19 these interviews with conference ethnography, and an analysis of technical literature.  
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21 Building upon our corpus, we seek to answer the following questions:  
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- 24 • How is Android structured? Who are the actors involved, and what is the Android building process?  
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- 26 • What inhibits Android updates? Where does software obsolescence manifest itself?  
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- 28 • What are the strategies of actors in Android or non-Android ecosystems in tackling maintenance issues?  
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30 After presenting related work on obsolescence, Android and maintenance, we detail our methodological approach.  
31 We then present our results as follows: first, we show how the Android operating system is structured into different  
32 software layers, the organizations involved in developing each of these layers, and the detailed pipeline for building the  
33 Android system. We then show what inhibits updates, and where obsolescence occurs in practice: which actors are  
34 involved and how. We analyze the development flow of the Android ecosystem, how actors interact in building and  
35 maintaining (or not). This allows us to identify maintenance breakpoints, that lead to premature end-of-life of devices  
36 and, consequently, their obsolescence.  
37

38 Our findings show that there is not one Android OS, but rather one specific Android build for each smartphone  
39 model. The lack of updates appears at the kernel level, i.e., at the core of Android builds, as the code from phone vendors  
40 and system on chip manufacturers increasingly diverges from the original Linux kernel code. Google, the main actor  
41 governing the Android ecosystem, addresses maintenance issues by seeking to create a dedicated private space within  
42 the OS for industrial actors (phone vendors, system on chip manufacturers), whereas the open-source community  
43 would prefer these same actors to contribute and share their knowledge. However, as vendors are the least inclined  
44 actors to maintain their code or share their knowledge, the problem remains. Given this tension, we observe how the  
45 remediation and maintenance strategies diverge, how the maintenance responsibility shifts from one actor to another,  
46 and how, driven by a concern for longevity, some phone vendors and alternative free and open-source mobile projects  
47 implement remediation strategies to maintain devices.  
48

49 Drawing on the Android ecosystem and existing literature analyzing complex socio-technical ecosystems involving  
50 open-source actors, we discuss the values and interests of actors, how they enact power, and the interplay between  
51 openness and closure in software development and maintenance.  
52

## 2 Background and related work

Android is the leading operating system worldwide. According to Google, it held 70% of the mobile OS market share in 2023, with approximately 3 billion active Android devices <sup>1</sup>, with the remaining 30% mainly held by Apple iOS.

A specificity of Android and its ecosystem is that it is structured around a major technology company, Google, but relies at its core on the Linux kernel, a free and open-source software (FOSS). It also involves industrial smartphone assemblers and manufacturers (known as OEMs, for Original Equipment Manufacturers, sometimes also referred to as “vendors”). This ecosystem is a unique mix of communities and organizations that interact with each other in building and maintaining the system.

In this article, we focus on the specific challenges related to maintaining and ensuring the evolution of the Android operating system on smartphones, both old and new. What interests us here is the “dumpster fire” [17] of socio-technical problems at the interface of the operating system, firmware (software embedded in hardware) and hardware, and how the various actors in the Android ecosystem engage (or not) in maintenance efforts.

### 2.1 Managing software obsolescence for industry needs

Software maintenance has been a long-standing concern in software engineering research and industry. While early methodologies attempting to deal with commercial-off-the-shelf obsolescence are related to hardware and spare-parts, software obsolescence became a topic of concern in the early 2000s [2, 37, 42, 48]. This led to a definition of software obsolescence centered around prediction for industry-specific needs [47]. Industries such as the military, aviation, rail, automotive or industrial machinery manufacturing, which are concerned with ensuring the longevity of the systems they integrate in their organizations, are often cited and taken as examples of organizations managing obsolescence, through forensics and prevention methods [16, 46].

### 2.2 Software maintenance and evolution

In the software industry at large, despite the emphasis on innovation in public discourse, much of the software work is centered on maintenance. As Webster et al. point out, “*maintenance is an unavoidable activity required to keep systems synchronized with the reality they are modeling, a reality that changes continuously*” [58]. As the environment in which the code evolves, the functioning code “decays” [12]. Synthesizing surveys in the literature, Canfora and Cimitile estimate that software maintenance consumes between 60% and 80% of the total life cycle cost of software projects [4]. But they also note that, according to these same surveys, a large share of these maintenance costs (75% to 80%) relates to enhancements rather than corrections. In this sense, maintenance goes beyond correcting bugs, with a large portion related to evolutive maintenance.

In FOSS systems, maintenance is central to the work of the communities that develop them. In their work on the labor of maintaining and scaling FOSS systems, Geiger, Howard and Irani detail how maintainers in the community have a central role, and how “*maintenance is not only about repairing and fixing. It is crucially about updating and changing to stay relevant*” [18].

### 2.3 Maintaining Android OS and Android applications in a fragmented ecosystem

A major version of Android is released every year, with the latest being Android 16 in June 2025 <sup>2</sup>. These new versions of the Android OS are not distributed or installed on all active devices: at any given time, several Android OS versions are

<sup>1</sup>Google blog - Android Updates 2023, accessed on Jan. 29 2025.

<sup>2</sup>Wikipedia - Android version history, last accessed in Sept. 2025.

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active simultaneously among them. Figure 1 shows the distribution of Android OS versions on active devices in April 2025, one month before the release of the new version 16. Android 15 was present on only 4.5% of the devices, versions 10 to 14 (six to two years old, respectively) were all widely used<sup>3</sup>, and more than 50% of the market was running an OS that was at least four years old OS (Android 12 and earlier version).




Fig. 1. Marketshare of Android OS distributions in April 2025

This proliferation of Android OS versions, mostly old ones, installed on many devices at any given time, has been called the Android fragmentation problem. It began being discussed and analyzed in specialized media<sup>4</sup> or business reports<sup>5</sup> as soon as 2010. Over time, fragmentation is discussed as being at the core of maintenance concerns of both the Android OS and of the applications running on top of it. It is both talked about by Android developers<sup>6</sup> and by scholars [23, 59, 60].

Fragmentation is then defined as a two-sided problem: a hardware-based and a software-based fragmentation<sup>7</sup>. Hardware fragmentation refers to the lack of hardware uniformity on Android (with Android devices holding different System on Chips (SoC), screen types, modems, etc.), which generates a lot of edge cases and bugs for developers to handle [23]. Software fragmentation refers to end-user devices running on different versions of Android OS.

At the software level, Android application developers face portability and compatibility issues, meaning that their code does not readily support multiple devices or Android versions (and its underlying libraries) [23]. Wei et al. show that app developers have to cope with the ways in which various smartphone vendors defined default values, the way they expose some of their Application Programming Interfaces (API) in idiosyncratic ways, etc. When updated to fit more recent OS versions and to follow the newest Android Software Development Kit (SDK), apps tend to be optimized for newer, more powerful devices. This can lead to performance issues on older phones such as taking a long time to respond, needing more resources, therefore leading to battery use and slow-downs [59], which in turn lead to faster replacement of devices by users [39]. Linares-Vasquez et al. also note that apps leveraging changing APIs tend to receive lower user ratings [32]. Because App developers are concerned with ratings [31], worsening ratings could lead them to artificially deprecate old applications, to avoid maintenance efforts and bad ratings.

Last but not least, by running old OS versions, phones are exposed to security risks, leading to a high rate of device renewal in work environments, but also in communities and contexts that emphasize software security [29, 53]. This narrative is also pushed by industrial actors who often emphasize security as a reason for OS upgrades, or for changing hardware. Recent scholarship on security brings some nuance, Korn and Wagenknecht propose to consider ‘security research’ as an ambivalent form of repair and maintenance [27]. They examine how frictions arise in what they call

<sup>3</sup>Android distribution data from Google, April 2025, last accessed in Oct. 2025.

<sup>4</sup>See V. Madhav, *Fragmentation in Android: Boon or Bane*, 2010, last accessed in Feb. 26, 2025.

<sup>5</sup>Opensignal report on Android fragmentation in 2012, and then yearly until 2015, accessed on Feb. 26, 2025.

<sup>6</sup>Linux World News discussion on fragmentation, accessed in Feb. 2025.

<sup>7</sup>See S. Singh, *An Analysis of Android Fragmentation*, 2012, last accessed in Feb. 2025.

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5 “social arena of repair” between industrial actors and hacker and security activists. Kocksch notes that computer security  
6 is situated and should be seen as living with fragility [26].

8 **2.4 Smartphones, SoCs and new maintenance vulnerabilities**

10 Android OS has several specific features as an operating system developed for mobile devices. The main component  
11 of a smartphone is the system on chip (SoC). A SoC is a single chip containing all the key components of a system  
12 soldered side by side: one or more microprocessors, the memory, one or more graphics processors to manage display or  
13 AI calculations, modems (for mobile networks or WiFi) and sensors (Bluetooth, infrared, biometrics, etc.). The very  
14 fine soldering of these components in a single chip saves space, uses less energy, and allows the creation of portable  
15 battery-powered devices such as smartphones. Their design and manufacturing in a single piece allows mass industrial  
16 production at lower costs [5]. SoCs are complete embedded systems that began being commercialized in the early 2000.  
17 Their technical development has led to the emergence of IoT devices and smartphones as well as companies dedicated  
18 to SoC and smartphone production such as Qualcomm, MediaTek, Samsung Exynos.

19 SoCs come with embedded software which is code that provides low-level control of its components and manages  
20 peripheral hardware. When a smartphone is in use, SoC’s embedded software manages all the interactions that happen  
21 with phone components (touchscreen, cameras, speaker, microphones, etc). A SoC carries both hardware and software  
22 architectures, that are co-developed simultaneously during the design flow [25]. This creates new intertwined hardware  
23 and software maintenance vulnerabilities: replacing a faulty component in the finely soldered SoC is difficult, even for  
24 professional repairers, while embedded software adds a layer of dependency [20] that, according to Greengard “*makes it*  
25 *easier for manufacturers and rights holders to block repairs and control the aftermarket*”. While civil society organizations  
26 engage more and more in Right To Repair campaigns<sup>8</sup> insisting on the fact that reclaiming full ownership of hardware  
27 and software in order to control devices is an important strategy for addressing obsolescence, there is a need to better  
28 study the role that SoCs play in software maintenance of smartphones or other embedded systems.

32 **2.5 Social practices around maintenance**

33 Beyond the software industry, scholarship on “maintenance and repair studies” developed at the intersection of various  
34 fields, from geography [19], to sociology [9]. This work broadly attempts to tie the literature on Care to the material  
35 consideration related to maintenance and repair [10]. It draws notably on Anne Marie Mol [38] and Maria Puig de la  
36 Bellacasa work on articulating “*maintenance and repair as processes dedicated to restoring order*” [10]. This approach  
37 invites to consider tools and technical artifacts not as solid and permanent but as fragile objects, with a constant need  
38 for care to remain functional. This scholarship has studied infrastructures, cars, homes, and more, but is much more  
39 limited when it comes to software and ICT. Marisa Leavitt Cohn’s study of maintenance at NASA [6] is an exception.

40 Daniela Rosner and Morgan G. Ames, building upon field studies of repair practices, also note that “*breakdown and*  
41 *repair are not processes that designers can effectively script ahead of time; instead, they emerge in everyday practice*” [45].  
42 This relates to the fragile nature of digital technologies emphasized by Steven Jackson: breakdowns are constitutive  
43 of technological systems and happen all the time [24]. But their identification and the worthiness of maintenance is  
44 constantly negotiated. Den Hollander [7, 8] also suggests that obsolescence and product lifetime are not just technical  
45 qualities, but affected by social, economical and interaction factors that can be influenced and changed over time.

50 <sup>8</sup>See e.g. Right to Repair Europe, PIRG USA, or organizations on the iFixit worldwide map.

261 By focusing on the relationships and the social arrangements taking place in software production and the technical  
262 constraints shaping development, scholars in science and technology studies contextualize software production not  
263 only as a technical issue, but as a socio-technical one, in which technical constraints will shape social order, as much as  
264 social and organizational forms will define how software is produced. This can be seen in Kocksch and Jensen LM: 's  
265 recent study of cybersecurity practices in small and medium enterprises [26], places in which fragility must be managed  
266 and risk constantly negotiated.  
267

268 At a more macro level, Maldini et al. discuss how research literature and current regulations on product lifetime  
269 extensions are often based on the unproved assumption that industrial production does not come as an adaptation to  
270 user demand, but elements tend to suggest that overproduction occurs frequently [35]. By studying the market and  
271 social history of everyday objects, including smartphones, Guien [21] argues that obsolescence is at the very heart of  
272 the business model for consumer goods and has been theorized as such since early management studies in the 1930's.  
273 From this historical and economic perspective, obsolescence and longevity should not be understood as states, but  
274 rather as being produced and managed, in a society structured around the push towards consumption of new products.  
275

### 276 3 Methods

277 This work is part of a broader effort of the authors to understand obsolescence of mobile devices, which involved  
278 prior field work on the perception of obsolescence, participatory workshops on smartphones upgrades, and active  
279 monitoring of public debates on smartphone longevity. This led us to wonder what makes Android smartphones  
280 especially challenging to update and maintain.

281 Our investigation was carried out on three complementary levels. We conducted 12 interviews with actors of the  
282 Android OS ecosystem. We also carried out conference ethnography at both in-person and online conferences and  
283 developer gatherings of Android ecosystem actors. We also analyzed historical and technical documents on specialized  
284 websites, media and developer online spaces.

#### 285 3.1 Interviews

286 We conducted semi-structured interviews with twelve informants from September 2023 to November 2024. Some of  
287 them took place in person during conferences or gatherings, while others were conducted online. For each interview,  
288 we presented the purpose of the interview and explained how the information would be used. In the interview consent  
289 form, informants who agreed to talk to us could choose to appear anonymously or with their real name and professional  
290 activities. One participant preferred anonymity. Furthermore, every participant received a copy of the paper that was  
291 submitted, with an invitation to review and discuss what they would consider as misrepresentations or errors.

292 3.1.1 *Informants.* We interviewed 12 main informants presented in Table 1. A significant part of our work consisted of  
293 identifying informants with deep knowledge of Android and its ecosystem. Given Google's centrality, we contacted  
294 several developers working at the company while being transparent about our research topics and questions. After  
295 several months we received a final email stating that the corporate position was not to communicate with researchers  
296 about Android on these sensitive topics. Nevertheless, we interviewed an informant working at the company before we  
297 received the "official" position.

298 At the smartphone manufacturer and vendor level, we conducted interviews with Fairphone employees, a company  
299 that builds and markets a "fair and durable" device, as well as Commown, a company promoting smartphone longevity  
300 through an original business model.

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#	Name	Organization/Project	Function	Date	Duration
1	Agnès Crepet	Fairphone	Head of Software Longevity & Information Technology	2023-09-14	1h
2	P2 (anonymized)	Google	Developer	Fall 2023	1.5h
3	Marvin Wissfeld	MicroG & LineageOS for MicroG	Main developer of MicroG	2023-12-22	1h
4	Emanuele Rocca	Debian & ARM	Debian developer and maintainer, ARM developer	2023-11-25	1h
5	Ben Hutchings	Debian & Linux kernel	Maintainer for Debian Linux kernel packages and linux-firmware repository	2024-05-20	1h
6	Arnaud Ferraris	Mobian	Linux on mobile and Mobian team leader	2024-11-19	1.5h
7	Federico Ceratto & Jochen Sprickerhof	Mobian	Developers	2024-05-16	1h
8	Denis Carikli & David Ludovino	Replicant OS	Main developers	2024-07-01	2.5h
9	Johannes Schauer Marin Rodrigues	Debian & MNT reform	Developer for MNT Reform port in Debian	2024-05-19	1.5h
10	Elie Assémat	Commown	Cofounder	2023-09-20	1.5h
11	Adrien Montagut-Romans	Commown	In charge of advocacy towards France and EU administrations	2024-09-16	1.5h
12	Simon Gougeon	UnifiedPush	Main developer	2025-12-05	1.5h

Table 1. List of interviews

At the OS level, we interviewed developers working on the Linux kernel upon which Android is built. We also interviewed Debian OS developers. Both clarified distributed development practices related to maintenance.

Notably we interviewed two developers with experiences on adapting the Linux kernel on a new System on Chip (SoC), a process called porting. These interviews clarified how the kernel communicates with hardware embedded software (also called firmware) at the SoC level, in order to implement full device functionality at the OS level (through drivers).

We interviewed several developers and community members of Android-based alternative OSes, such as LineageOS, LineageOS for MicroG and Replicant. We interviewed the main developers of two important tools for the Android OS: UnifiedPush, a decentralized open-source protocol and libraries for push notifications in Android that follows the IETF WebPush standards; and micro-G, a free open-source implementation of the Google Play Services. We also interviewed non Android Linux-based OS developers from PostmarketOS and Mobian. These helped us understand community coding practices and policies implemented over time, to facilitate development and maintenance in smartphone OSes that also derive from Linux but differ from Android's industrial dominant ecosystem both in coding values and practices.

*3.1.2 Analysis process.* The interviews were crucial in understanding the Android development ecosystem, actors, interactions and identifying friction points, or points of interest for our research questions. Because they took place at different stages of our research, over an extended period of one year, they played different roles. Some were decisive in that they brought to our attention an unexpected issue that proved important in our understanding. These key issues then guided our next interviews: when something caught our attention during an interview or the analysis process, we

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organized new interviews and continued conference and desktop research to explore these specific issues and deepen our understanding.

The interviews were audio-recorded with the consent of the interviewees. Most of them were transcribed to text by using the Vosk offline open-source speech recognition toolkit<sup>9</sup>, followed by a human transcription. The transcripts served our study in several ways: deepening our understanding by discovery of key points, highlighting uncertainties and questions to be clarified, triggering new interviews or research on them. We kept a text journal of the most important quote excerpts from these transcripts, and what they triggered or highlighted. Many of them also appear in this article. Further quote excerpts were added from conferences that we attended in person or watched online, all being freely available in audio, video or text-transcribed versions. This selection was motivated by the relevance to our mapping of the ecosystem, to the interactions between actors, and finally, to our findings and discussion points. During the writing process, the quotes were carefully checked within their context before being used.

Mappings of the interactions within the ecosystem, of the Android stack, and of the development pipelines played an important role in our analysis. The iterative process of creating, discussing, and fine-tuning the resulting figures among co-authors, enabled us to identify limitations in our understanding of Android, map interactions among actors and organizations, and instantiate abstract discourse to specific development activities. These diagrams also enabled us to confront our understanding with external informants familiar with the Android ecosystem. They could (in)validate our understanding of Android, signal elements they discovered thanks to us, or direct our attention to shortcuts or missing elements in our mappings.

### 3.2 Conference ethnography

The first author participated in person in conferences, multiple-day community gatherings and followed numerous online conferences on the technical aspects of Android OS development and update process, including: the annual Linux plumber conference (online), the annual Linux kernel recipes conference (online), the Open Firmware conference (online), Capitole du Libre (online in 2023, in person in 2024), the Free Silicon conference (in person) about free and open-source design and manufacturing of chips, the Debian OS annual conference (online) two European Debian OS community gatherings (in person), as well as the FOSS on Mobile Devices conference day at FOSDEM in 2024 and 2025 (online). This conference immersion also enabled the first author to conduct interviews, get recommendations, and learn through discussions with developers from the Linux, Android and alternative OS communities, some dynamics that did not surface in more formal communications.

### 3.3 Technical documentation immersion

To complement the ethnographic work, we analyzed the official Android developer documentation by Google, technical documentation on alternative Android OS based systems such as LineageOS, LineageOS for microG, e/OS, Replicant, GrapheneOS and on alternative non Android mobile OSes based on Linux, such as PostmarketOS and Mobian. These helped us better understand specific problems or techniques such as fragmentation, porting, upstreaming, mainlining, backporting. We also followed specialized news and analysis media such as lwn.net (a Linux news and information website), 9to5google.com (news about Google) Android Authority (news about Android) or OS News (news about operating systems), and selected articles from Ars Technica, The Verge or Wired magazines. We also leveraged developer

<sup>9</sup>The Vosk Speech Recognition Toolkit repository

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5 community forums and mailing lists for specific information about OS releases (e.g. xda-developers, Reddit, Fairphone  
6 or e/OS community forums).

7 Reports and research work by and on the Right to repair movements in different continents [33, 50, 54, 56, 61]  
8 together with our interview with one of Commown's co-founders working in advocacy, were important to understand  
9 software-hardware repair and maintenance issues worldwide, as well as the state of regulations in the US, where the  
10 movement for Right to Repair originates, in France, and at the European Union (EU) level. At the economical and legal  
11 level, the reports on the Android antitrust infringement cases against Google in Europe [49][14], in the US [44], UK,  
12 recently in Japan<sup>10</sup>. In particular, the detailed investigations on Google that some of these reports [40, 41] detail, helped  
13 us to understand Android practices, to confirm or mitigate some of our findings, and to learn more about contractual  
14 relations between Google and vendors.

### 17 3.4 Positionality statement

18 The first author has been continuously installing and testing mobile OSes for the past 10 years, and discussing within  
19 the community of hackers problems and solutions related to software on old smartphones. The first author is also an  
20 active member of La Quadrature du Net, a French nonprofit organization defending digital rights, as well as of April, a  
21 French nonprofit defending and promoting free software technology and its ethical and social values<sup>11</sup>.

22 The co-authors have backgrounds in design and computer science. They are part of a broader project studying  
23 digital obsolescence and longevity from a technical and social point of view. As such, all authors have followed and  
24 organized numerous exploratory workshops and discussions both with developers, hackers and users on smartphone  
25 usage, settings, tweaking, or hacking.

## 26 4 Results

27 We now outline the socio-technical challenges of developing and maintaining Android. We first present an overview of  
28 Android software layers, focusing on the ones that are relevant to upgrading and maintaining Android. We present the  
29 organizations involved in developing these layers, and the Android build pipeline (4.1). Building upon this technical  
30 picture, we detail how obsolescence happens in practice (4.2) and what inhibits maintenance (4.3). Simultaneously, we  
31 present how the actors involved tackle (or not) maintenance problems, the strategies they develop to enable software  
32 maintenance on aging smartphones (4.3) and their limits (4.4).

### 33 4.1 An overview of Android

34 As the most widely used operating system in the world, Android should not be seen only in the technical sense assigned  
35 to operating systems in the Computer Science literature, i.e. a tool to abstract device hardware and manage resources  
36 for its users and their applications (the OS kernel). We study Android as a complex ecosystem, involving hardware  
37 manufacturers, phone vendors, app developers, and end-users, all interacting with each other in technical but also  
38 commercial, industrial, legal and social ways.

39 *4.1.1 Android software layers and actors.* To give a sense of the Android architecture, in Figure 2 (left) we offer a  
40 simplified overview of its software layers, and for each of them we explain their role and the actors involved in their  
41 development, maintenance and governance.

42 <sup>10</sup>On the Japan Fair Trade Commission's Google Decision: Some Early Reflections, Sangyun Lee, Kyoto University, April 2025, last accessed in Nov. 2025.

43 <sup>11</sup>See La Quadrature du Net's and April's websites.

10


5            The **Hardware and Firmware layer** (bottom) represents the code embedded into the hardware of smartphone  
 6            devices. Every piece of smartphone hardware, be it modems, cameras, sensors, touchscreens or System on Chips (SoC),  
 7            comes with embedded software, often called firmware. Embedded software is necessary to ensure the functioning of the  
 8            hardware and to provide low-level control of the hardware to higher-level software such as the operating system. This  
 9            software is developed and maintained by the hardware manufacturing companies for the Android ecosystem. They are  
 10            responsible for providing fixes when bugs or security issues are discovered, or for updating the software when a new  
 11            version of the Android operating system requires it.  
 12           

13            The **Operating System (OS)** abstracts device hardware and manages the device resources for its users and their  
 14            applications [51]. The OS communicates with the hardware via dedicated software libraries often called drivers, which  
 15            interact directly with their firmware. Google is the main developer of the Android OS, defining a general scheme for  
 16            these drivers and the system to interact with hardware components. The drivers and OS modifications are provided  
 17            by phone vendors and phone hardware manufacturers in order to ensure that the specific cameras, modems or other  
 18            components are functional in the OS.  
 19           

20            Finally, the **Application layer** is where anyone can introduce new software, with the aim of developing applications  
 21            (apps) that make the phone directly usable to its users.  
 22           

23            On top of these three software layers, we identified two cross-layers. First, the **Background system-wide services**  
 24            and **apps** containing applications and libraries that often run in the background (are not immediately visible to the  
 25            user), are pre-installed in the phone, and have special privileged access to the whole Android system. These can be  
 26            created by Google, phone vendors or network operators and include services or applications such as localization, data  
 27            tracking, advertisement injection, push messaging, permissions management, network services, etc. Most of the time  
 28            they cannot be uninstalled by users, and if blocked or uninstalled by experienced users using special techniques there  
 29            is a risk of altering phone functionalities. They are most of the time proprietary code software of Google or phone  
 30            vendors, as for example Google Play Services (a Google system-level package of services that almost all Android apps  
 31            depend on), Samsung Push Services (a Samsung system-level package of services that Samsung apps depend on), etc.  
 32           

33            The second transverse layer is the **System on Chip & hardware integration** one, which we identified as a collection  
 34            of software code, firmware and drivers, hardware documentation and schematics, or “hacks”, that are needed in a mobile  
 35            phone to support its particular SoC, and all other hardware such as touchscreen, battery, etc. They can be located both  
 36            in the OS layer for their core functionalities (for example, a generic driver making a camera work), but can also be very  
 37           



51            Fig. 2. Android software layers (left) and Zoom into the Android OS composition (right)  
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53            Manuscript submitted to ACM  
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## 3 Producing Software Obsolescence: the case of Android OS

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5 specific to the device, or in the application layer (to make the camera perform in a device-specific way, make brighter  
6 pictures, have special features, etc.). Without them, the device cannot function properly.  
7

8 4.1.2 *From a Linux kernel to an Android build.* The Android installed on a smartphone is the result of multiple actors:  
9 from the Linux community to Google, SoC manufacturers, phone vendors, and network operators. In the following, we  
10 detail the various software artifacts involved in the production of Android as it is deployed (see Figure 2, right).

11 An Android build corresponds to a version of Android created for a specific device model. For each smartphone  
12 model, a specific Android is built and installed on it, which is ultimately the Android build experienced by end-users.  
13 These builds are all based on Android Open Source (AOSP) developed by Google, but diverge in what Marvin Wissfeld  
14 (participant 3) explained as follows:

15 “*Each phone has its own OS, there is no universal installable image for Android like we are used to in  
16 desktop computing. The AOSP is open source, but we cannot deploy it on physical hardware, for that we  
17 need additional drivers or firmware, that are available only for the specific hardware the phone is made of,  
18 and are not open source in general. A custom ROM, an Android build for a device, is what you put on top of  
19 the AOSP plus drivers and firmware strictly needed to get the hardware running, and many of the services  
20 and applications that Google and manufacturers put on top of it. AOSP itself is not for real hardware, is not  
21 relevant to end users, it is running only on emulators.*”  
22

23 At its core, Android is based on the free and open-source Linux kernel. A kernel is a basic fundamental software  
24 component at the core of an OS, providing important hardware functionalities and facilitating hardware and software  
25 interactions. Over 1000 contributors forming the Linux community contribute to each release, which involves over 8  
26 million lines of code. Every 9 to 10 weeks a new stable mainline kernel is released and published on kernel.org. Usually  
27 once a year, a stable kernel is picked and designated as a long term support (LTS) kernel.

28 Google develops and releases a new version of AOSP every year. To do this, an LTS Linux kernel will be used by  
29 Google to create the Android Common Kernel (ACK) at the core of every new AOSP version to be released. An ACK  
30 is an LTS Linux kernel with extra code from other branches of the Linux kernel such as “*new Android features under  
31 development in the Linux community*”, and “*Vendor/OEM<sup>12</sup> features that are useful for other ecosystem partners*”<sup>13</sup>. Any  
32 version of AOSP contains an ACK and all the necessary functionalities of an OS that make its specificity: in the case of  
33 Android the way the system interacts with hardware components (e.g. the touchscreen or the camera), how hardware  
34 components interact with each other (e.g. the battery with the CPU), how the user interacts with the system (e.g.  
35 through a custom UI layer).

36 Luca Weiss, an Android developer at Fairphone, describes how the ACK is then used<sup>14</sup>: “*Based on [an] ACK branch,  
37 the SoC manufacturers take it, add some support for their SoC on top, and then finally, device manufacturers get this code  
38 base and put their device-specific changes on top*”. First SoC manufacturers develop their kernel by adding a large amount  
39 of SoC specific code on top of an ACK kernel, this ACK corresponding to a given Android AOSP version and a given  
40 LTS Linux kernel. For every device manufactured with a given SoC, vendors take this SoC’s specific kernel and add to it  
41 the extra hardware-specific code and drivers (for the touchscreen, battery, camera, etc.). The resulting kernel is what is  
42 sometimes called a *vendor kernel*, or sometimes, “*frankenkernel*”—a term that we will discuss further below.

43 <sup>12</sup>OEM: Original Equipment Manufacturer

44 <sup>13</sup>From the [AOSP official documentation](#), accessed on Jan. 13, 2025.

45 <sup>14</sup>[Mainline Linux on Fairphone? Yes, please!](#), Capitole du Libre, Toulouse, Nov. 2023, last accessed in Dec. 2025.

12

573 On top of the vendor kernel, vendors take the corresponding AOSP version released by Google, usually add to it  
574 drivers needed by the phone components, creating an Android OS build able to run only on this specific phone device.  
575 In this phase, vendors also customize Android by adding their own user interfaces, system-wide services or apps as part  
576 of the transversal Background layer. When these phones are marketed by network providers, the latter also customize  
577 the Android system by adding their own user interface, system-wide services or applications. most of the time these  
578 changes (drivers, services and applications) are not open-source code.  
579  
580

581 The specific nature of the Android OS, consisting of one build per device, and how these builds accumulate specific  
582 software from various actors, is one of the first main findings of our study. We noticed that this is not something  
583 that is widely known or understood, even among developers or on specialized media. From a software perspective,  
584 smartphones are indeed quite different from personal computers, where the same generic OS (whether based on Linux  
585 or Windows) can be installed by the user regardless of specific key hardware components such as the motherboard, the  
586 processors, or the memory they hold. In Android smartphones, the SoCs, holding both key hardware and software  
587 components, seem to play a central role in the specificity of the OS builds, on top of which actors each add their own  
588 software layer of specific hardware features, services or applications.  
589  
590

#### 591 4.2 Obsolescence in action 592

593 Given the Android build pipeline described in the previous section, we will now clarify how specific Android builds  
594 pose maintenance issues and can become obsolete in the ecosystem. In Figure 3, we illustrate this build process, from  
595 the Linux kernel to Android builds, for two specific smartphones: the Motorola Moto G7 and the Fairphone 3.  
596  
597

598 4.2.1 *How lack of updates appears.* Every year, Google releases a new version of Android based on two or three of the  
599 latest Linux LTS kernels and creates an ACK for each LTS kernel used. Each ACK will be the core of the new Android  
600 versions specific to a device. For example, Google Android OS version 9 was released both as version 9-4.4 (based on the  
601 ACK coming from LTS 4.4), and as version 9-4.9 (based on LTS 4.9). As we will explain later, maintaining or disrupting  
602 maintenance for one of these versions has an impact on the obsolescence of the devices that were put on the market  
603 with these Android versions. In Figure 3 we only detail the Android development process based on LTS 4.9 (marker A).  
604  
605

606 The Motorola Moto G7 and the Fairphone 3 were both put on the market in 2019, and were both shipped with the  
607 same Qualcomm Snapdragon 632 SoC. Both smartphones were running on Google's Android version 9-4.9 (marker B),  
608 and contained a kernel built by Qualcomm specifically for the Snapdragon 632 SoC in 2019 (marker C). The LTS kernel  
609 4.9 of these Android builds, was released in 2016 by the Linux kernel development community.  
610


611 **When they were released, in 2019, the Android builds on both smartphones were based on a 3 years old  
612 Linux kernel.** The LTS 4.9 had been released in 2016, and the Linux community defined its "end-of-life" (end of official  
613 support) in January 2023. According to A. Ferraris (participant 6), Google needs time to develop an ACK based on  
614 a given LTS kernel (one or two years), after which SoC manufacturers in turn need extra time to develop the SoC's  
615 specific kernel on top of this ACK (another one or two years).  
616

617 Qualcomm, **the SoC manufacturer, never upgraded its kernel after the 4.9 LTS kernel.** Qualcomm only applied  
618 some of the security updates that LTS 4.9 received from the Linux community. Qualcomm applied these updates to its  
619 SoC kernel for only two years before stopping updates altogether in 2021. Motorola then applied these updates to its  
620 Moto G7 phone before stopping in 2021, two years after the phone's release. At that time, the Qualcomm frankenkernelf  
621 was based on a five-year-old Linux kernel that had been upgraded five times to newer versions, each of which had been  
622 updated many times with bug fixes or security patches.  
623

624 Manuscript submitted to ACM

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13



32 Fig. 3. Android builds for Fairphone 3 and Moto G7 phones with update breaks appearing at different points

36 These two observations reveal poor maintenance practices in the Android ecosystem: few software updates and early  
 37 end of support. This is quite unusual when compared to development and maintenance practices of some of the most  
 38 well-known operating systems derived from the Linux kernel in the Desktop world, such as Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora,  
 39 Red Hat OS, etc. They generally closely follow the updates and upgrades of the latest LTS kernels, by implementing all  
 40 bug fixes and security patches, as well as new features and developments contributed to the Linux kernel as hardware  
 41 evolves. Study participants emphasized how alignment with LTS kernel releases facilitates frequent but small changes,  
 42 as opposed to larger, more complicated changes, when updates are infrequent and occur after long periods. Luca Weiss  
 43 from Fairphone explains in 14 when talking about Qualcomm's frankenkernels 4.9 for Snapdragon 632:

45 “The code that we got from Qualcomm [of frankenkernels 4.9] is about 2.5 million lines of difference compared  
 46 to the 4.9 LTS kernel that is being released upstream. And it is about 18000 commits. This also shows why it  
 47 is not really possible for a device manufacturer to rebase all of this 2.5 million lines and make them work.”

49 “Rebasing” is a development practice consisting in applying changes made to a derived code (in this case the  
 50 frankenkernels), to the original code from which the derivation occurs (here the LTS Linux kernel) by resolving code  
 51 conflicts.

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677 conflicts, dis-functionalities and making sure everything works how it should. The biggest the changes between the  
678 derived code and the origin are, the more difficult the rebase becomes.  
679

680 The changes made by Google to the LTS Linux kernel are also significant and not aligned with the LTS kernel, as  
681 explained by Arnaud Ferraris from the Debian and the Mobian mobile project:

682 “When Google makes the kernel for Android [ACK], it modifies the whole core part of the Linux kernel  
683 with the scheduler, memory management, power management, to make it compatible with the Android OS.  
684 Google tries to upstream this code so that it is available in the Linux kernel, so when the Linux kernel gets  
685 updated Google does not have to deal with it anymore, unless Google changes these parts. But the process of  
686 upstreaming patches into the kernel takes time: there will always be a first version, comments from the  
687 Linux kernel team, things that the Google developers had not thought of—the kernel maintainer will have  
688 their own Linux logic—and code will generally need to be modified several times before we gradually arrive  
689 at a final version. So, despite a genuine desire to do things upstream, we still have an ACK from Google that  
690 has a lot of downstream code when it is passed on to the SoC manufacturer. But, downstream code is code  
691 maintained only by Google. Every time the Linux kernel is updated, the downstream code must also be  
692 updated from Google, and then passed to SoC manufacturers once again. This code may become upstream  
693 at some point in the future. But at a given time, it is downstream code. Why? Because upstreaming takes  
694 time, and Google’s pace is not that of the Linux community, they are not completely in sync, they have  
695 their own Android pace.”  
696

697 4.2.2 *Upgrades lacking backward compatibility.* Beside the lack of software update previously observed, we observe  
698 new breaking points that appear when Google upgrades, on a yearly basis, from one version of Android to another.  
699

700 As illustrated in Figure 3, in 2021, two years after the release of the Moto G7 and Fairphone 3, **Google introduced**  
701 **kernel backward incompatibility in the new Android version 12, which was based on kernel ACK 5.4, and no**  
702 **longer on ACK 4.9.** (marker D). Android OS upgrades were no longer available for 4.9 kernels. This marked the end of  
703 the support from Qualcomm of its 4.9 frankenkernels for the Moto G7, the Fairphone 3 and all other phones holding  
704 this SoC (which was confirmed by P1). In 2021, Motorola had upgraded the Moto G7 only once, from Android 9 to  
705 version 10<sup>15</sup>. When Google stopped providing the 4.9 version when releasing Android 12, Qualcomm stopped updating  
706 the phone’s frankenkernels to the ACK of Android 12 and Motorola stopped upgrading the phone to newer Android  
707 versions (marker E).  
708

709 But this backward incompatibility did not make upgrades impossible. As Agnès Crepet (participant 1), head of the  
710 *Software longevity and IT* team at Fairphone told us, they managed to upgrade its OS on Fairphone 3, despite the lack  
711 of support. When Google released Android 12, and Qualcomm stopped updating the SoC’s frankenkernels, Fairphone  
712 maintainers took over. Luca Weiss, who was then a volunteer developer on the LineageOS and PostmarketOS projects,  
713 two alternative community-driven mobile OSes, was hired in the team because of his knowledge of this specific SoC.  
714 The updating process of the abandoned Qualcomm SoC frankenkernels took time and was finalized after Android 13 was  
715 released, so the company decided to release an upgrade of Fairphone 3 directly to this new Android 13 in 2022 (marker  
716 F). This update was possible in great part because of the community work from the alternative OSes—PostmarketOS  
717 and LineageOS mostly—that had taken over maintenance work on Qualcomm’s abandoned frankenkernels by applying  
718 security patches and functionalities needed to keep compatibility to the Linux kernel or Android newer versions  
719 whenever possible. Their work is made available to the community in open-source repositories, while device trees—data  
720

721 <sup>15</sup>See Motorola’s update announcement followed by specialized media [Techradar analysis](#), December 2020, archived, last accessed in Dec. 2025.

729 structures describing all the device components needed by the kernel to use and manage those components—are shared  
730 together with available documentation. Various discussion spaces for users and developers to interact also exist<sup>16</sup>.  
731 Based on this work, the newly formed Software Longevity team of seven people at Fairphone succeeded in updating an  
732 Android build after both Google and the SoC manufacturer had stopped doing so.  
733

734 4.2.3 *Upgrades introducing new features that break compatibility.* One year later, the release of Android 14 brought  
735 new breakdowns in updates. As Weiss explains in 14: “*With Android 14 released in 2023, Google is introducing some new*  
736 *features that are not present at all in kernel 4.9. AOSP is dropping support for these kernel versions sort of aggressively, as*  
737 *they do not support any of the new features that [Google] wants to use in Android 14*”. In July 2024, Fairphone announced  
738 to its users<sup>17</sup> that the FP3 phone would not be upgraded to Android 14 and beyond anymore (marker G):  
739

740 “*We invested considerable time and resources into exploring ways to integrate the new Android system*  
741 *with the existing kernel, and even contemplated upgrading the Linux kernel itself. We also engaged in*  
742 *discussions with Google Android Engineering. The legacy Linux kernel (4.9) used in the Fairphone 3 [...]*  
743 *would not support Android 14 at all.*”  
744

745 FP3 would thus end software support in 2026, but would nevertheless continue to receive security updates on Android  
746 13 until then. With 7 years OS support, this makes the Fairphone 3 one of the longest supported Google certified  
747 Android OS phones, and as some specialized media say, the only phone manufacturer that maintains the OS after SoC  
748 support shut down<sup>18</sup>.  
749

750 We noticed that the LineageOS community managed to circumvent the above incompatibilities and keep the  
751 Fairphone 3 updated after Qualcomm, Google, and even Fairphone stopped supporting it. In November 2025 LineageOS  
752 with Android 15 could still run on Fairphone 3 (marker H). We discuss the circumvention strategies allowing longer  
753 maintenance from both Fairphone and LineageOS, but also their limits, in section 4.4 below.  
754

### 755 4.3 Disruptions to maintenance practices in the Android code flow

756 Based on our interviews, conferences and documentation analysis, we identified issues related to how changes to code  
757 developed by each actor are propagated within the Android ecosystem. The layers in the Android operating system  
758 shown previously in Figure 2, appear as code flows circulating from one actor to another. The breaking points, which  
759 we described previously, occur at different levels and affect code maintenance differently. Figure 4 illustrates these code  
760 flows, or lack thereof, and the resulting maintenance breakpoints.  
761

762 4.3.1 *Divergent maintenance practices inhibiting updates and creating technical debt.* In our interview, Arnaud Ferraris  
763 (participant 6) from the Mobian project, a Linux derived OS for mobile, talks about the great amount of added code that  
764 makes maintaining difficult in Android:  
765

766 “*This ACK by Google with downstream code in it passes into the hands of the SoC manufacturer, they add*  
767 *their own system drivers to manage hardware, then it is passed on to the phone manufacturer who will add*  
768 *other drivers. So we already have three levels of forked kernels, and when we finally look at the cumulative*  
769 *amount of changes that this represents, it's huge. If I take the example of the OnePlus 6 phone that we*  
770 *maintain for Mobian, this was 5 million lines of code compared to the Linux kernel used.*”  
771

772 <sup>16</sup>See the LineageOS user and developer [wiki](#), the [blog](#) that announces the new development releases and discusses changes. The same can be found for  
773 [PostmarketOS](#), and LineageOS based OSes that maintain Fairphone 3 such as [LineageOS for microG](#) or [e/OS](#).

774 <sup>17</sup>Announcement of end of support for Fairphone 3 in July 2024, last accessed in Dec. 2025.

775 <sup>18</sup>See Fairphone 3 gets seven years of updates besting every other OEM, [Ars Technica](#), July 2023, last accessed in Jan. 2025.




Fig. 4. The development flow of an Android build, red crosses indicates a lack of contribution to the original code-base.

In free and open source software development, *mainlining* is an important wide-spread coding and maintenance practice that refers to the integration of new developments into the main *mainline* source code branch in the project's repository. When developing upon the Linux kernel, mainlining is a two sided development flow: (1) systems derived from Linux follow the mainline Linux kernel development, and also (2) contribute back code to the Linux kernel as often as possible, through a process known as *upstreaming*.

Ferraris further explains the different development practices between phone manufacturers and free software communities:

*"There is a big difference most of the time between the kernels from phone or SoC manufacturers and kernels maintained by a free software community: manufacturers will create a software mess that suits their needs, while free software communities will make sure to make the minimum changes necessary for it to work and be accepted into the upstream Linux kernel. When developing we always try to keep this notion of upstreaming in mind [...] for the sake of sustainability and for the comfort of everyone, both users and developers, it's better for the changes to be upstream, and we try to think in advance how to make the changes we need so that they can be accepted in the kernel."*

Upstreaming enables mobile OS actors following the mainline Linux kernel, such as PostmarketOS and Mobian, to directly benefit from the various contributions to the Linux kernel. It also enables kernel maintainers to handle

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5 upstreamed contributions in manageable bits, isolating problems, using simpler tests and dealing with them on a daily  
6 basis. Other Android based OS actors, such as LineageOS, GrapheneOS, Replicant, even if they do not mainline the  
7 Linux kernel, follow upstreaming practices as much as they can, and collaborate in understanding and developing free  
8 drivers for phone components for which the code is neither public nor documented.

9  
10 As illustrated in 4.2.1, in the Android ecosystem, Google creates the ACK from the Linux kernel without mainlining it  
11 and only partially upstreaming code into it. SoC and phone manufacturers use these ACK to create the frankenkernels  
12 by adding code that is not designed to be contributed back to the Linux community: assembled from various internal  
13 codes, designed to meet their internal development needs and undocumented for external use, hence the prefix "franken".  
14 As the Linux mainline kernel evolves, the difference with SoC frankenkernels continues to grow, making it increasingly  
15 challenging to share and propagate code between them over time, as Ferraris explains:  
16

17  
18 *“It is code that is written internally, never submitted to the community. A manufacturer will have dozens  
19 of very different hardware references and generally, almost always, wants to have a single code base for all  
20 of them. As a result, they develop extremely complicated code filled with switches, if statements, internal  
21 compilation options used to enable or disable certain parts depending on their different hardware. What’s  
22 more, there is no public documentation for any of this code. Sometimes things seem magical when you read  
23 the code. It makes sense to manufacturers, but when we read it, because we don’t have any documentation,  
24 we don’t understand at all why they’re doing it, and we wouldn’t be able to explain it to the Linux kernel  
25 maintainer, or make it work, let alone provide a Linux kernel driver with it. This also makes reverse  
26 engineering complex.”*  
27

28 The use of nested if statements and switches is a known cause of what in computer programming is called *spaghetti*  
29 code, code that is fragmented, entangled, and thus difficult to understand and to maintain [43].

30 The divergence in development strategies outlined above, has created historical tensions in maintenance practices  
31 between FOSS communities such as the Linux kernel community, and hardware manufacturers such as phone vendors  
32 in our case. The Linux community aims to build a kernel that runs on as much hardware as possible and for as  
33 long as possible, whether that hardware is old or new. Manufacturers focus on developing code for new hardware  
34 by adding to their own existing code base. By using the Linux kernel, which implements the core functionalities of  
35 operating systems, they reduce the costs and time required for launching them [30]. But they show little interest in  
36 maintaining this code or contributing code back to the kernel in order to keep their hardware updated over time. The  
37 responsibility for code maintenance is transferred from manufacturers to the Linux kernel community or to the FOSS  
38 mobile communities maintaining old hardware. This shifted maintenance constitutes what is called technical debt in  
39 software development [15]. In software using the Linux kernel, the lack or delay of upstreaming, as well as obfuscated  
40 and undocumented code, are common factor in technical debt [22].  
41

42  
43 4.3.2 *Maintenance barriers: software obfuscation and circumvention strategies.* As maintenance shifts from vendors  
44 to the FOSS communities, access to hardware specifications and documentation becomes important. Luca Weiss, an  
45 Android developer at Fairphone, explained during a public conference, how access to private documentation shared by  
46 Qualcomm exclusively with phone vendors, enabled him to update the Fairphone/Spapdragon 632 frankenkernle from  
47 Android 11 to Android 13, and share it with the open source community:  
48

49  
50 *“Having access to secret documents now that I am working at Fairphone definitely makes things easier.  
51 Schematics, data sheets and documentation are confidential material. Schematics make it easier to build*

885       *the device trees, or hardware descriptions that the kernel needs, because some things are not obvious from*  
886       *the way the vendor-provided kernel has this written. Data sheets make it easier to write new drivers in case*  
887       *it's necessary."*

889       Additionally, hardware and smartphone vendors place a great emphasis on keeping code private whenever possible,  
890       by using intellectual property. The copyleft Gnu Public Licence (GPL) of the Linux kernel requires manufacturers to  
891       provide the code from the frankenkernels under GPL-compliant licences. As mentioned previously, this code is provided  
892       by vendors, but being too chunky, complex and undocumented, it is of little or no help for the open-source community  
893       in maintaining it. For phone components source code is never available, vendor drivers being almost always proprietary  
894       closed code. As articulated by participant 2, cameras for instance play an important role in vendor marketing strategies:  
895       differentiating devices on camera performance and features are key selling points in the smartphone market. Since  
896       software plays a key role in camera performance and their distinguishing features, vendors keep it private and well  
897       protected. Ferraris confirms:

901       *"Beyond the SoC in every phone there will be a screen that will need a very specific driver, the same goes for*  
902       *touch panels, and cameras are yet another problem because there is a lot of intellectual property involved*  
903       *in them. In the manufacturers kernels there is nothing to be found about these, everything is in the Android*  
904       *user space or elsewhere, in proprietary binary code form. How it works is well hidden."*

906       Because of this opaque nature, the binary code and drivers coming from manufacturers is often called *blobs* among  
907       Linux kernel developers and open-source communities. Trying to have the less blobs possible, by replacing them with  
908       functional open-source code, is an important issue, as these blobs do complicate maintenance when changes occur in  
909       the OS or in the kernels, or when security issues involving them arise.

911       A tension exists between Google and the Linux kernel community on these code blobs. Google attempts to create safe  
912       spaces for vendors directly into the Linux kernel structure, and to remove part or all of them from its Android layers.  
913       Linux kernel developers that place great emphasis on open source code are reluctant to create these safe spaces for  
914       vendors to put their binary code. They fear that instead of pushing vendors to open-up their code or at least contribute to  
915       the kernel community with documentation, these safe-spaces will push them to continue non-transparent development  
916       practices, which are precisely what complicates their maintenance and updating work.

919       This tension is clearly illustrated in a meeting report from a two-days workshop within the Linux kernel team  
920       dealing with camera hardware [52] involving kernel developers and Google employees. The report shows that Google  
921       contributes back, upstreaming code to the Linux kernel camera modules. This is useful both for the Linux kernel and for  
922       Google in the development of Android and Chrome OS, both based on Linux. During the meeting Google tries to push  
923       its idea to create a vendor specific code space inside the Linux kernel camera framework, where vendors can upstream  
924       blobs and keep the intellectual property of their devices safe. The reaction of the Linux kernel team maintainers clearly  
925       illustrates the tension: [52]: *"Upstreaming a driver requires opening up the driver interfaces [in Linux kernel practices].*  
926       *There appears to be near-unanimous consensus on this apart from Google. It is not an option [for the Linux community] to*  
927       *upstream a driver that has support for undocumented closed features. Basically [Linux kernel] maintainers can not put*  
928       *their name on something that contains unverifiable (for them) and unusable (by all except the vendor) features."*

931       Extremely large commits, spaghetti code and blobs are considered anti-patterns that negatively impact program  
932       comprehension [43], specifically during maintaining tasks [1], while program comprehension and documentation are  
933       considered central to effective software evolution and maintenance practices in software engineering studies [3, 57]. As  
934       illustrated above, all of these patterns appear in the Android OS ecosystem.

4.3.3 *Google's two-tier Android development strategy: reinforcing fragmentation when trying to address it.* Google has  
recognized the persistent Android OS fragmentation problem, (i.e. multiple versions of the Android operating system  
present on active devices at any given moment), with multiple active Android devices not being upgraded to the  
latest Android OS version. The company has implemented several strategies to facilitate updates in order to reduce  
this fragmentation. In 2017, when launching project Treble<sup>19</sup>, Google Android development team declares: “we've  
consistently heard from our device-maker partners that updating existing devices to a new version of Android is incredibly  
time consuming and costly”. Treble consists in implementing a modular base for the low-level architecture of the OS  
in order to better isolate vendor code. Later in 2020, Google also launches the Generic Kernel Image (GKI) project to  
address kernel fragmentation by “moving SoC and board support out of the core kernel into loadable vendor modules so  
they can be updated independently.”<sup>20</sup>.

By isolating vendor code both in the ACK and in AOSP, Treble and GKI attempt to help Android actors offer faster  
roll-out updates. This technical isolation is welcomed from vendors willing to maintain their phones, as Agnès Crepet  
from Fairphone (participant 1) told us. But it does not enforce changes to their updating policies and coding practices.  
Regardless of the underlying technical stack improvement, the obfuscated vendor code remains, and updates still depend  
on the willingness of vendors in maintaining their code and devices. Data from 2025 attests that fragmentation is still  
pervasive (see Figure 1) and Android OS updates have not significantly improved on user devices since 2017.

The vendor code isolation also facilitates Google's own work of developing and maintaining AOSP as vendor blobs  
interfere less with the rest of Android. But the approach here differs from that of the Linux kernel community on blobs  
that consists in integrating them as much as possible in the system, in order to facilitate maintenance. Google has no  
need for vendor blobs to be completely open-source, documented or intelligible. By isolating vendor space, Google can  
continue developing AOSP while leaving its partner vendors free to “blobify” and maintain secrecy over their specific  
hardware code.

This allows for another shift in maintenance responsibility, from Google to vendors. But vendors' lack of maintenance  
remains unaddressed. And it is precisely the lack of maintenance of vendor code—Android OS builds specific to every  
device that are being little or not maintained—that leads to the Android fragmentation situation.

4.3.4 *Google's double-standard Android updates strategy: from deprecation to forced dependencies.* In the Applications  
and Background services of Android (Figure 2), updates are fine-tuned to serve Google's business model and interests.  
As Marvin Wissfeld (participant 3), that develops microG, a free open-source implementation of Google Play Services,  
notes:

“[Google] stopped updating apps on AOSP, the clock app, the messaging app. They update only in the sense  
that they make sure they are still compatible, but do not add new features. They fully update only the  
proprietary versions coming with the Google-licensed Android. In the Google messaging app they integrated  
their own messaging proprietary system. They leave AOSP behind, add small features to the Google versions  
of the apps, and put on top of them a dependency on Google Play Services. ... [Manufacturers] take the  
proprietary Google apps requiring Google Play Services.”

As an AOSP derived OS, LineageOS development closely follows that of Android: when Google releases a new  
Android version, LineageOS releases a new complying version. Google's lack of updates in AOSP are quite silent, as  
official Android release announcements do not usually mention them. By analysing LineageOS new version release

<sup>19</sup>Here comes Treble, 2017, Google Developers blog, last accessed in Feb. 2026.

<sup>20</sup>Generic Kernel Image documentation, last accessed in Feb. 2026.

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announcements (called changelogs), one can better spot this lack of maintenance and sometimes complete deprecation of essential Android apps. For example, in the Android 14 release in 2023, Google deprecated the Dialer and the Messaging applications in AOSP, with a discrete message revealed by specialized media<sup>21</sup>, written in the repository of the source code for the deprecated apps, saying: *"This app is not actively supported and the source is only available as a reference. This project will be removed from the source manifest sometime in the future".*

In this case, a shift of maintenance towards open-source communities is clearly at play. When the corresponding LineageOS (version 21) was released some months later, it announced that it had taken over the maintenance and further development of the deprecated apps:<sup>22</sup>:

*"Since AOSP deprecated the Dialer, we have taken over the code base and did heavy cleanups, updating to newer standards (AndroidX) and redesigning[...]. While Messaging was also deprecated by AOSP, at least the Contacts app was not. Nonetheless we gave both of them an overhaul and made them also follow the system colors and look more integrated."*

Google's strategy of selective updates in AOSP is accompanied by contractual agreements between Google and its vendor partners. These agreements ensure that vendors systematically install an Android version with Google proprietary services and applications. Such contracts frequently stipulate the exclusive use of Google applications, for instance by prohibiting vendors from installing another search engine. In some instances, the contracts may also preclude vendors from marketing devices using an alternative Android-based operating system. As elaborated in 5.3, these practices have been the subject of lawsuits and rulings against Google for abuse of dominant position in several countries worldwide.

As Wissfeld notes, Google Play Services integrate telemetry, gathering user data used for advertisement purpose, advertisement that is injected back in the applications via these same services<sup>23</sup>. The Google Play Services also serve Google's business interests as one of the dominant actors of web and mobile advertisement<sup>24</sup>.

4.3.5 *How forced dependencies inhibit sustainable maintenance and resilience.* When the use of Google applications and services essential to the Android OS is not contractually enforced, it is *de facto* ensured. Wissfeld (participant 3) told us that he has seen these services evolve and become more and more present in the Android ecosystem. While essential system apps get less updates in the AOSP version, they gain Google Play Services dependency in their final official Android build.

Indeed, the most widely used Android development environments and libraries, such as Android Studio or the Firebase platform, both developed by Google, integrate unavoidable dependencies to Google Play Services and Google's Firebase Cloud Messaging. As a result, most Android application developers integrate these services in their apps. Google's Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM), formerly known as Google Cloud Messaging (GCM), implements the push notification system that enables applications, such as messaging or emailing ones, to use Google servers for sending notification messages to the apps on the user phones (e.g. each time a new message arrives). Given that one of the essential uses of a smartphone is messaging, the push messaging systems are crucial in mobile ecosystems. The technical implementation of FCM is dependant on Google Play Services: in order for FCM to function, Google Play Services have to be present in the user's phone. However, neither FCM nor Google Play Services are implemented in AOSP. As a

<sup>21</sup>Google further guts the AOSP by deprecating the dialer and messaging apps, OSnews, June 13, 2023, last accessed in Dec. 2026.

<sup>22</sup>LineageOS version 21 announcing new Android 14 release in Changelog 28, February 14n 2024 last accessed in Jan. 2026.

<sup>23</sup>See Ads Safety, the user data telemetry and advertisement injection service integrated in Google Play Services, last accessed in January 2026.

<sup>24</sup>See Google Ads program for mobile apps, Google.com, last accessed in January, 2026.

## 3 Producing Software Obsolescence: the case of Android OS

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5 result, most vendors market Android phones with Google apps and Play Services, and almost Android apps integrate  
6 the Play Services and use the Google FCM system.

7 Moreover, the Google Android device certification system, the *Play Protect Certification*, a set of tools for testing  
8 Android devices offered by Google to phone vendors and users in order to label their Android phone as “*certified by*  
9 *Google*”, includes mandatory checks of the presence and activation of Google Play Services. Mandatory for device  
10 vendors having a contractual agreement with Google, this certification mixes AOSP compatibility tests with Google  
11 services and apps tests. Moreover, it is marketed by Google as a safety guarantee for Android phones, while its absence  
12 is presented as a severe security issue in Google’s communication<sup>25</sup>:

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15 “*Devices that aren’t Play Protect certified may not be secure [...] may not get Android system updates or app*  
16 *updates. Google apps on devices that aren’t Play Protect certified aren’t licensed and aren’t real Google apps.*  
17 *Apps and features on devices without Play Protect certification may not work correctly. Data on devices*  
18 *without Play Protect certification may not have a secure backup.*”

19 Thus, certification becomes another way of enforcing Google dependencies in practice, and presenting their lack as a  
20 severe security issue.

21 In alternative Android-based OSes such as LineageOS, LineageOS for microG, or e/OS (a LineageOS derivative OS),  
22 dependencies from Google are partially removed via use of microG, that reimplements the Google Play Services, removes  
23 telemetry and advertisement, but still allows installed apps to use the Google servers via FCM. Open and standardized  
24 alternatives that allow to remove all Google dependencies and keep functional systems have been developed in recent  
25 years. One of them is UnifiedPush, an open-source system for push notifications in mobile ecosystems implementing the  
26 WebPush IETF open standards (RFC 8030, RFC 8291 and RFC 8292)<sup>26</sup>, that has been implemented by various open-source  
27 systems such as Element, Conversations, Nextcloud, Mastodon, KDE, Mozilla. Simon Gougeon (participant 12), creator  
28 and main developer of UnifiedPush, explained to us how using an open standard for push notifications offers resilience  
29 in the long term:

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32 “*The Google push notification system is centralized, fully depends on Google. Huawei in China has its own*  
33 *centralized push notification system. In countries or situations where Google, Huawei, or other actors are*  
34 *not present, or their presence can change for economical or geopolitical reasons, UnifiedPush can provide*  
35 *standardised push notifications for Android phones. Also, in a context of climate crisis, if a region loses its*  
36 *access to the Internet, Google’s push notification system is not available anymore. If a regional network*  
37 *takes is implemented until the global Internet access is restored, UnifiedPush can quickly be deployed in it*  
38 *and help keep phones connected. This is the advantage of open decentralized standards, they have resilience*  
39 *and can take over when centralized services are not available, not desirable or have failed.*”

40 Following our interview, Gougeon published a retrospective article on UnifiedPush, developing on the issues he  
41 had discussed with us<sup>27</sup>: “*When a service is controlled by a single entity, nothing can be done when they consider your*  
42 *device too old to be supported*”. For him, services as fundamental as push notifications in mobile systems should be  
43 implemented inside the main Android code as open standard APIs. Reflecting on the future of UnifiedPush he says “*The*  
44 *best thing that could happen to UnifiedPush on Android [...] would be for it to no longer exist. If Google gives us in Android*

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60<sup>25</sup>Google Android Help Center, last accessed in Dec, 2025

<sup>26</sup>IETF: International Engineering Task Force, the main international technical standards organization for the Internet. See IETF WebPush push notifications standard documents, last accessed in Jan. 2026.

<sup>27</sup>Simon Gougeon, 5 years of UnifiedPush, F-Droid.org, Jan. 8, 2026, last accessed in Feb. 2026.

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1093 *a system API to let the user define their push service we would not need UnifiedPush anymore. [...] Hopefully, working on*  
1094 *UnifiedPush can push in that direction by increasing the demand, and highlighting the need*<sup>28</sup>.

#### 1096 4.4 Success and limits of obsolescence circumvention strategies

1098 The obsolescence circumvention strategies and maintenance efforts do not come without drawbacks for the FOSS  
1099 communities and some phone vendors that put effort in it. Fairphone and LineageOS achieved to maintain the Fairphone 3  
1100 after Qualcomm abandoned its frankenkernell and Google removed support for Android OS 12, but faced difficulties in  
1101 implementing these update strategies on the long run.

1103 Update problems became particularly important with the release of Android 12 in 2021, which broke the backward  
1104 compatibility with kernel 4.9 and below. One reason is that *eBPF*, a tool to manage network traffic in the Android kernels,  
1105 replaced the old *iptables*. Updating devices running on kernel versions 4.9 “*proved challenging due to the sheer number of*  
1106 *commits and structure changes*”, while for devices using older kernels the upgrade was not possible anymore<sup>28</sup>.

1108 The update process of taking parts from a newer version of a software system and porting them to an older version of  
1109 the same software is called *backporting*. It is a common practice when preferred maintenance solutions like *upstreaming*  
1110 or *mainlining*, are not taking place. Backport code is often applied as patches in order to incorporate changes into an  
1111 old code-base (the term *patching* is also used).

1113 To maintain the Fairphone 3, Fairphone and LineageOS backported changes introduced in Android 12 to its old  
1114 frankenkernell (based on kernel 4.9), which both Qualcomm and Google had stopped supporting. They also included  
1115 security patches from the Linux kernel team, which Qualcomm had stopped offering. After the release of Android  
1116 15, Fairphone announced<sup>29</sup> that it would stop offering Android upgrades to Fairphone 3, due to the eBPF structural  
1117 changes that became too complicated to backport. Yet LineageOS with Android 15 can still run on the Fairphone 3,  
1118 thanks to backports provided by the open-source communities, even after Fairphone stopped its upgrades. But, for  
1119 vendors aiming at the Google certified phones, like the Fairphone does, the stricter rules and controls of Google’s *Play*  
1120 *Protect Certification*, make things more complicated than for alternative actors, used to release OSes with sometime  
1121 bugs and missing features, and to fix them in subsequent updates when possible.

1123 Nevertheless, as Google adds new features with each Android release, backports become increasingly difficult to  
1124 maintain. For developers in the open-source communities we interviewed, backports are seen as a temporary and  
1125 inadequate solutions to the update problem. Because backports are code that is neither mainlined nor upstreamed,  
1126 but comes as patches of code applied at a given moment, when the ecosystem evolves, patches need to be updated  
1127 independently every time. Thus, patches face the same update issues as frankenkernels from vendors do: they are  
1128 difficult to maintain, especially when they come in big chunks of code.

1129 Some alternative mobile OS projects such as PostmarketOS or Mobian, choose to completely detach themselves from  
1130 Android and its frankenkernels by directly following the Linux mainline kernel development for mobile phones. Older  
1131 devices are regularly abandoned by LineageOS maintainers, while mainline projects like PostmarketOS and Mobian  
1132 succeed in maintaining very few devices, but having a much more reliable maintenance system because mainlining and  
1133 minimization of patching is here a primary focus. But all of these communities in fine face the same frankenkernell  
1134 and patching problems. As smartphones grow older and new hardware is released, the burden of kernel maintenance  
1135 grows on them, while the number of users and maintainers for older devices shrinks, thus decreasing the possibility to  
1136 sustainably maintain code.

1137 <sup>28</sup>LineageOS 19 (corresponding to Android 12) new release announcement [changelog](#), April 2022, last accessed in Jan. 2026.

1138 <sup>29</sup>A post on the Fairphone forum announcing the first Android 14-based build of LineageOS for Fairphone 3, last accessed in Dec. 2025.

**5 Discussion and perspectives**

Our results show that the complex Android OS production pipeline generates frictions and lacks of incentives to support maintenance and upgrades in the ecosystem. We reflect now on the values and macro forces shaping this situation.

**5.1 On the various types of software maintenance and their role in obsolescence**

Towards the end of this study, we realized that the act of updating software is not or little questioned per se by the actors of the Android OS ecosystem. Our informants all assumed that updates are a necessity and that their absence is what causes obsolescence. This is what is defined as Lehman's law of continuing change [28]: "a program that is used undergoes continual change or becomes progressively less useful."

But do updates always respond to a need to mitigate obsolescence and make devices last longer in a useful and safe way ? We notice that each actor had its own way of approaching and envisioning updates and that all had different rhythms. It starts with the continuous development at the Linux kernel or derived OSes that follows, willingly or unwillingly, the endless changes in the hardware market. Then comes the yearly upgrades of Android that sometimes introduce new features, or new development behaviors that break retro-compatibility or make device updates more difficult. From phone vendors we observed few scattered updates before abrupt stops. Some alternative actors had a continuous maintenance process (PostmarketOS, Mobian), while others responded to breakdowns by attempting various forms of repairs or standardisation of practices (Fairphone, LineageOS, microG or UnifiedPush).

Both the diverging nature of updates as well as their different timing among actors of the Android ecosystem, play a central role in the fragmentation. Also, it remains unclear to what extent enforcing forms of backward compatibility could enable smartphones to remain functional without updates, as their broader software environment evolves.

Nevertheless, updates should at least be considered as ambiguous regarding the role that they play in maintenance. Updates are not necessarily only acts of maintenance and care for the devices and the ecosystem. They can and do also trigger incompatibilities and obsolescence. While updates are generally presented as a way to avoid obsolescence, updates from an actor become the obsolescence of another. Maintaining then becomes the obligation to cope with unwanted updates or the act of feeding the "monster" that the software to be maintained has become.

**5.2 Values and choices in OS production and maintenance**

From these different types of software maintenance we observe that "official" Android providers (Google, phone vendors) and alternative Android or non Android mobile providers define software quality in different ways, according to divergent values and interests. These different values then lead to different temporalities in producing or maintaining code, and different software quality criteria.

*5.2.1 Different values lead to different code quality criteria.* Vendors and chipset manufacturers value putting new hardware products on the market at a frequent pace (every 6 months or every year) and have limited incentives to update their products. The drivers, frankenkernels and software they produce are mostly oriented towards new devices. Once the device is on the market, they do not offer clear update policies for consumers, perform little updates and the end of support of old devices comes silently and quite often as quickly as two years after release. The recent European regulation (EU) 2023/1670 laying down ecodesign requirements for smartphones among other devices <sup>30</sup>, in effect since June 2025, enforces OS security updates and upgrades for at least 5 years after the product has been released. How this

<sup>30</sup>European Regulation (EU) 2023/1670 summary, last accessed in May 2025.

5 directive will play out in reality, how smartphone vendors will implement it in practice, and how monitoring will be  
6 carried out, remains to be seen.

7 The Linux and alternative OS actors value open-source code, documented development practices, code longevity, and  
8 even hacking techniques, considering them legitimate. For them, updates and maintenance are continuous processes,  
9 following coding practices that foster collaboration and ease of updating. Alternative Android or mainline-Linux kernel  
10 communities place a greater emphasis on running on old, no longer supported architectures and having control on the  
11 software stack.

12 Google values its control over the ecosystem. Its attitude towards the various actors changes during the course of  
13 the study. In May 2025, the company announced<sup>31</sup> that Android OS would be subsequently developed internally in a  
14 fully private and closed-source way, before the code is pushed to its public branches once development is finished. This  
15 unilateral decision of closing development raised many concerns: for alternative OS actors maintenance becomes even  
16 more difficult as they can no longer perform maintenance as a continuous process<sup>32</sup>.

17 5.2.2 *Variations in the temporalities of code production and maintenance.* These diverging values affect the temporality  
18 of code production and maintenance practices among actors. Alternative actors are efficient in updating and maintaining,  
19 while developing functionalities or community collaboration methods are slow processes requiring much more effort.  
20 Vendors have slow maintenance and update rates, for short times, while often producing new frankenkernels for new  
21 devices.

22 5.2.3 *Variations in code quality criteria.* Code quality is also considered differently. Google and phone vendors will put  
23 greater efforts on user experience and standardisation. They will only green-light OS updates that fully pass functional  
24 and feature oriented quality tests at release time on every new device, while leaving aside maintenance work.

25 Alternative OS will favor code openness, privacy, security, sometimes accepting a lack of functionality (e.g. frequent  
26 issues with GPS or cameras on LineageOS, or with audio and battery gauge on postMarketOS) while being fully  
27 transparent about this. Code quality in these communities will rather relate to the ability to facilitate collaboration  
28 and long term maintenance. The users are part of the development and maintenance process: they are expected to test  
29 and report bugs as developers fix them and push updates. Infrastructure and tools are provided for this functioning:  
30 forums where users and developers can interact and react on bugs and updates, as well as more technical tools for bug  
31 reporting or code contributions into the project repositories.

### 32 5.3 Power in the Android ecosystem

33 Google plays a central role in the Android Ecosystem. It owns the trademark and what can be called Android, it controls  
34 AOSP, its code and coding process, as well as the proprietary services and the core applications present on most Android  
35 phones. It also licenses the Android name and logo to manufacturers through the Android Compatibility Program  
36 (ACP)<sup>33</sup>. Android phone manufacturers that want to license Google's apps and services, are required by Google to  
37 enter an agreement called the Android Compatibility Commitment (ACC) [40, 41]. Previously called, almost ironically,  
38 the Anti-Fragmentation Agreement (AFA), it obliged vendors not to distribute any device based on an alternative  
39 Android OS alongside devices running on Google-Android. An antitrust legal case against Google by the European  
40 Commission (EC) in 2018<sup>34</sup>, deemed it to be anti-competitive and to hinder the development of Android alternative

41 <sup>31</sup>Exclusive: Google will develop the Android OS fully in private, Android Authority, 26 May 2025, last accessed in Jan. 2026

42 <sup>32</sup>AOSP isn't dead, but Google just landed a huge blow to custom ROM developers, Android Authority, 12 June 2025, last accessed in Dec. 2025

43 <sup>33</sup>See Android Brand guidelines and Compatibility Program, last accessed in Feb. 2025.

44 <sup>34</sup>European Commission case against Google, last accessed in Feb. 2025.

OSes [49]. According to the EC conclusions, these tying practices consolidate Google's dominance and abuse of power in the Android ecosystem and exploit status quo-bias from users who are tied to Google Apps on everyday smartphone activities [36]. Similar antitrust infringement cases against Google have occurred in the US [44], in UK and more recently in Japan<sup>35</sup>.

As a consequence, Google replaced AFA with ACC in Europe and vendors could then distribute alternative Android OSes on all of their devices. But they still have to follow the ACC guideline stating that only devices that signed the agreements can use and display the term "Android", a registered trademark of Google<sup>36</sup>. These cases and changes in agreements between vendors and Google did change the situation a little in some regions. The vast majority of vendors continue to offer Google-equipped only Android phones. But some small phone vendors now offer, alongside the traditional Google-equipped Android phones, an alternative version with preinstalled de-Googled OSes: Fairphone since version 3 comes also with e/OS, Shift phones come also with ShiftOS L or e/OS, HIROH comes only with e/OS, to name a few.

According to Google [40], AFA and ACC are responses to the threat of incompatibility or fragmentation to Android. But our study suggests quite the opposite. Alternative Android OSes are concerned with maintaining updated devices, developing strategies of remediation to counter the lack of updates or maintenance largely responsible for the fragmentation problem. As for maintenance and updates, the definition of fragmentation is a matter of perspective, which varies depending on the point of view and values considered.

The same goes for power. SoC manufacturers, phone vendors and network providers have agency. The case of Fairphone demonstrates that vendors with limited resources can maintain Android builds twice as long as average, when they are willing to. As for Google, as repeatedly demonstrated by the various antitrust cases worldwide, it is able to exert power over vendors when it directly serves its interests. But when it comes to enforcing updates, Google's approach is much less coercive. Google ensures that the ecosystem provides a safe environment for vendors, by protecting their intellectual property and traditional production methods, and relies on their goodwill for maintenance. Meanwhile, the incentives to integrate Google services and applications into the OS are much stronger.

#### 5.4 On the many forms of openness

Google has always emphasized the open nature of Android. Google acquired Android Inc. together with its developers and founders, in July 2005, and in November 2007, announced<sup>37</sup> the first Android platform and OS version. The announcement also stated that Android development would be handled by the Open Handset Alliance<sup>38</sup>, a consortium of many international phone vendors and network providers, led by Google. Here is how they were presented in 2007: *"the first truly open and comprehensive platform for mobile devices. It includes an operating system, user-interface and applications – all of the software to run a mobile phone, but without the proprietary obstacles that have hindered mobile innovation. [...] We hope to enable an open ecosystem for the mobile world by creating a standard, open mobile software platform. We think the result will ultimately be a better and faster pace for innovation that will give mobile customers unforeseen applications and capabilities. [...] Our goals must be independent of device or even platform".*

Our work shows that this openness is confusing in the Android ecosystem. Android is indeed based on open-source code developed in FLOSS communities, Google also produces some open-source code at the AOSP level, but inside and on top of them, lie layers of proprietary closed-source code, undocumented hardware or software functionalities,

<sup>35</sup>On the Japan Fair Trade Commission's Google Decision: Some Early Reflections, Sangyun Lee, Kyoto University, April 2025, last accessed in Nov. 2025.

<sup>36</sup>Google starts blocking uncertified Android devices from logging in, Ron Amadeo, 2018 Ars Technica, last accessed in Jan. 2025.

<sup>37</sup>Google Blog: Where's my Gphone?, last accessed in Oct. 2024.

<sup>38</sup>Wikipedia - Open Handset Alliance, last accessed in March 2024.

missing policies, and forced behaviors. The resulting OS is a “frankenware” system that the FLOSS communities have trouble understanding and maintaining. The narrative that is also pushed by Google is that of the security as a reason for OS upgrades and big changes in behaviour. Recent scholarship on security by Korn and Wagenknecht propose to consider ‘security research’ as an ambivalent form of repair and maintenance [27]. They examine how frictions arise in what they call “*social arena of repair*”, and how agentivity is distributed asymmetrically among actors, some of which possess the privilege to repair (industrial actors) while others (hacker and security activists) do not.

FLOSS communities have formed their identity on the notion of code openness, reflecting on it not only as a technical value, but as a form of political activism for building digital commons, considering them through the same lens as important public infrastructure, such as public roads, a metaphor used by Eghbal in her work on the making and maintenance of open source software [11].

But as FLOSS projects grow and become embedded in complex ecosystems like Android, involving Big Tech and other industry actors, they become part of what can be seen as what Ekbia and Nardi have called “heteromation” [13]: a set of practices of industrial actors to extract economic value from under-compensated or free labor in computer-mediated networks. Moreover, this does not only conflict with values of openness towards digital commons in FOSS systems, this also affects deeply their ecosystem. As Geiger, Howard and Irani show, the activities and experiences of maintenance work change and are seriously challenged [18], as FOSS projects are embedded within these broader ecosystems.

### Recommendations

Building on our analysis and insights from informants, we identified a set of practices that could support mobile software maintenance:

- updates should not lead to breaking changes and should provide retro-compatibility for long periods of time (e.g. min 10 years);
- if breaking changes were to happen, they should be localized, and not system wide;

Because maintenance practices are enacted only when they align with the values and objectives of the stakeholders involved, it is also necessary to enforce them through regulation. The following recommendations range from the easiest measures to larger-scale transformations that would more radically improve longevity:

- require phone vendors to publish update and upgrade plans for every device, and ensure that they are followed;
- require phone vendors, SoC manufacturers and software companies to liberate all code, schematics and documentation related to hardware behaviour upon expiration of the warranty and support period;
- include mainlining and upstreaming conditionality into FOSS licences;
- require all components of a mobile system (firmware, OS) to be maintained for at least 10 years;
- all OS components should be required to follow (or define) open public standards, to avoid proprietary software lock-ins;
- consider mobile OS as public infrastructure, governed as digital commons.

### 6 Conclusion

In this paper we studied maintenance practices around the Android operating system: a complex ecosystem that involves open source actors, as well as large and diverse industrial actors. Android OS is the result of their cumulative work, a complex software with billions of lines of code, which can run on highly diverse hardware and which is deployed on

billions of devices. Despite this relative success, Android OS versions are short lived, Android smartphones are rarely updated, and compared to other devices, their lifespan is short.

Building on interviews with developers in the Android and other Linux-derived ecosystems, we show how Android OS differs from a traditional desktop OS: an Android OS build is unique to each device, which dramatically complicates the maintenance process. By mapping the Android ecosystem, the interaction between its actors, and the development flow of Android builds, we show how the actors of this ecosystem have diverging and often conflicting update and software maintenance strategies.

SoC developers and phone vendors have little incentive to maintain the code of the Android kernels that they build for each device, let alone contribute back (upstream) to the Linux kernel on which they are based. This would imply following community conventions and practices that allow for code sharing, documentation, easy updates and better long term maintenance. This lack of contribution also shapes the way these actors code. They focus on their internal specific needs, producing code that increasingly differs from the open-source code base, is little or not documented and contains several anti-patterns. This means that even if available, later opened or reverse-engineered, the code is particularly challenging to understand, reuse or maintain, denoting a lack of care and consideration for the community upon which it builds.

Key player in the ecosystem, we found that Google exercises its power in a selective manner, focusing on creating channels for selective updates, and enforcing its own proprietary services and applications while being reluctant to enforce upstreaming from SoC manufacturers and phone vendors. Long-term maintenance responsibility and work is transferred to free and open-source actors such as the Linux kernel community, alternative mobile OS systems such as LineageOS, Mobian, PostmarketOS, microG, UnifiedPush to cite a few, or to some phone vendors which emphasize longevity such as Fairphone. Because of lack of documentation, code accessibility and lock-ins, these actors put significant effort and develop circumvention strategies in order to maintain some Android builds on specific devices for seven, sometimes up to ten years.

Last but not least, by discussing these maintenance issues in the Android ecosystem, our work provides a better socio-technical understanding of software obsolescence and remediation strategies and offers recommendations for more sustainable software systems.

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